Qualified Immunity as a Defense to
Federal Wiretap Act Claims
Kathleen Lockardt

In 1968, in response to several high-profile criminal cases involving the surveillance of U.S. citizens without a warrant,' Congress
passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of

1968, known as the Federal Wiretap Act ("FWA"). 2 Before passage of
the FWA, Congress saw a gap in federal, state, and local provisions
regarding forms of surveillance due to technological innovation. It
concluded that the present state of the law was "extremely unsatisfac-

tory" and served. "neither the interests of privacy nor law enforcement."3 The FWA embodies the dual purposes of Congress: first, protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications and the integrity
of court proceedings; and second, preserving the ability of law en-

forcement to use taps in legitimate criminal investigations.! With respect to the first goal, the statute provides strict limits on the ability of
law enforcement officials to tap suspects without proper approval and
authorizes civil suits against officials who violate the Act.'
With respect to the second goal, Congress recognized that wiretapping was an effective evidence-gathering mechanism, in particular
against organized crime.' Congress feared that the safeguards it established to protect innocent citizens from wiretapping (limits on unapproved tapping, plus civil suits for violations) could overdeter the use

t B.S.F.S. 1995, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; J.D. Candidate 2002,
The University of Chicago.
1 See Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 353 (1967) (finding government recording of a
phone call from a public phone booth was a "search and seizure" under the Fourth Amendment);
Berger v New York, 388 US 41, 44 (1967) (finding state statute regarding electronic eavesdropping "too broad" and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
2
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-351,
82 Stat 212,223 (1968), codified at 18 USC § 2510 et seq (1994 & Supp 1998).
3
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, S Rep No 90-1097, 90th Cong, 2d
Sess 67, reprinted in 1968 USCCAN 2112,2154.
4
S Rep No 90-1097 at 10-11 (cited in note 3) (discussing the purpose of the FWA and
Congress's concerns with the proliferation of tapping of innocent persons, while recognizing the
importance of tapping as a tool against organized crime).
5
18 USC §§ 2511,2520.
6
See, for example, S Rep No 90-1097 at 70-71, reprinted in 1968 USCCAN at 2157-58
(cited in note 3) (noting the need for effective tools to combat organized crime and recognizing
that efforts had largely been unsuccessful to that point in combating this "parasite," which was
draining an estimated seven billion dollars per year from the economy).
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of wiretapping in bona fide criminal investigations.7 Congress did not
intend law enforcement officials who attempted to comply with the
statute, but for some reason had obtained an imperfect authorization,
to face civil liability. Thus, the statute includes a "good faith" defense
to protect officials who attempted to comply with the letter of the law,
but for some reason beyond their control failed to do so.8 Congress did
not provide additional guidance for interpreting this "good faith" defense, but courts have generally read the "good faith" requirement to
include a subjective inquiry into the belief and motivation of the defendant.9
At the time Congress passed the FWA, the good faith defense
0 Qualified
was adjudicated on terms similar to qualified immunity."
immunity most often arises in the context of constitutional tort suits
against state officials under 42 USC § 19831 ("Section 1983") or

against federal officials, as first recognized by Bivens v Six Unknown
12
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.
It provides a defense
to officials who violated constitutionally protected rights but who
acted with a good faith belief that their behavior was permitted. 3 Before 1982, qualified immunity provided a defense if the official's good
faith belief was "reasonable." The defense had two components: (1)
subjective, good faith motivation by the official and (2) a requirement
that a reasonable person would have known that a constitutional right
had been violated. 4 Early FWA cases confirm that courts treated the
subjective evaluation of good faith under both defenses in the same
fashion."
In 1982, the Supreme Court
Harlow v Fitzgerald changed the
test for qualified immunity to in
a purely objective standard. Post-

S Rep No 90-1097 at 11 (calling wiretaps "an indispensable aid to law enforcement").
See 18 USC § 2520(d) (listing "good faith" reliance on imperfect authorization as a
complete defense).
9 See, for example, Tapley v Collins, 211 F3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir 2000) (finding that the
good faith defense requires inquiry into the subjective belief of the defendant, and is generally a
jury question).
10 See discussion in Part III.A.
11 42 USC § 1983 (1994 & Supp 1998). See text accompanying note 22.
12 403 US 388, 395 (1970) (authorizing damages to remedy Fourth Amendment violation
by federal officials).
13
See, for example, Butz v Economou, 438 US 478, 500 (1978) (allowing qualified immunity as a defense to constitutional tort suits); Wood v Strickland,420 US 308,314-20 (1975) (discussing qualified immunity as a defense to Section 1983 claims).
14 Wood, 420 US at 322 (1975) (outlining the objective and subjective components of the
good faith qualified immunity defense).
15 See, for example, Chagnon v Bell, 642 F2d 1248,1257 (DC Cir 1980) (analyzing the possibility of a good faith defense under the qualified immunity standard); Kilgore v Mitchell, 623
F2d 631, 633 (9th Cir 1980) ("If the requisites of the statutory good faith defense are met, then
the standard for qualified immunity ... is also satisfied.").
16 457 US 800 (1982).
7

8
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Harlow qualified immunity requires an objective inquiry into whether
the right violated was "clearly established," and whether a "reasonable
person" would have known this at the time. '7 The FWA good faith defense and qualified immunity were no longer the same. In recent cases,
federal circuit courts of appeals have examined whether defendants
may assert qualified immunity as a separate defense to alleged FWA
8
violations, reaching divergent and irreconcilable results.
This Comment will examine whether qualified immunity should
be available as a defense to FWA claims given that the statute includes its own good faith defense. Part I addresses the basics of qualified immunity, the FWA, and its good faith defense, procedural differences between the two, and principles of statutory preclusion. Part II
compares the three recent federal cases discussing the FWA's good
faith defense. Part III analyzes older FWA cases and comparable statutes for guidance as to the congressional purpose of the FWA. Part IV
proposes that, in light of the purpose of the FWA, defendants should
not be able to assert qualified immunity as a defense to FWA civil
suits.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT
This Part begins by examining the basics of qualified immunity
and its evolution to an objective standard. Next, it discusses the statutory good faith defense provided by the FWA. Then it examines the
procedural differences between the two defenses. Finally, this Part
concludes by examining statutory preclusion, setting out the basic criteria for finding that a federal common law action is precluded by
statute.
A. Qualified Immunity
Section 1983 provides individuals with a private right of action
against state officials to vindicate federally protected rights.' 9 Congress
intended Section 1983, enacted as a tool of Reconstruction, to deter
states from violating constitutional protections and to provide citizens
with a remedial measure. 0 Section 1983 accomplishes these goals in

17

Id at 818.

See Part II.A.
See 42 USC § 1983.
20
See Melissa L. Koehn, The New American Caste System: The Supreme Court and Discriminationamong Civil Rights Plaintiffs,32 U Mich J L Ref 49,54 (1998) ("Congress knew that
18
19

federal resources were limited and the federal government could not monitor the actions of
every state and local government employee, so section 1983 gives the 'man of the street' the ability to enforce his or her own constitutional rights in court.").
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broad language without detail to instruct courts." The statute states
that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, . . . subjects ...
any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights ...shall be liable to the
party injured.;", In Bivens, the Supreme Court allowed the same type
of suit under the Fourth Amendment against federal officials to remedy constitutional torts." Courts adjudicate Section 1983 and Bivens
actions on the same basis; the only differences between the two are
that Section 1983 is statutory and applies to state officials, while
Bivens is a federal common law cause of action that applies to federal
officers."

As a remedial regime, Bivens and Section 1983 permit victims to
recover damages, although neither provides any guidance on how to
value such damages. Jury instructions in these cases instead follow
general common law standards for compensatory damages.25 The Supreme Court has denied damages for the value of the underlying constitutional
violation, so plaintiffs must show an actual injury to recover
26
damages.

Both Bivens and Section 1983 also help to deter future constitutional and statutory violations." However, there is a tension between
the desire to achieve a level of deterrence without paralyzing government operations and the goal of allowing recovery by an individual.
The individual remedy tool, if unchecked, could result in a flood of
frivolous lawsuits and lead to government paralysis.* Section 1983
contains no statutory defenses to mitigate its breadth. But, in part because of these concerns, the Supreme Court has read Section 1983 "in
21

See 42 USC § 1983.

22

Id.

Bivens, 403 US at 390-92 (rejecting the argument that Fourth Amendment violations by
federal agents do not give rise to a federal cause of action). The court allowed Bivens, who had
alleged that federal agents searched his home and arrested him without probable cause, to sue
for damages based on the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. Id.
24
See, for example, Wilson v Layne, 526 US 603,609 (1999) (stating that both Section 1983
and Bivens allow plaintiffs to seek money damages against government officials).
25 See Memphis Community School Districtv Stachura,477 US 299,306-08 (1986) (finding
that damages in Section 1983 and Bivens actions are solely compensatory damages analogous to
those available to remedy common law torts).
26
Id at 308 (stating "the abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for
§ 1983 damages").
27
See id at 307 (finding that "[d]eterrence is also an important part of [the Section 1983
regime]"). Consider Bivens, 403 US at 407-08 (Harlan concurring) (stating that deterrence is not
the sole reason to permit claims for damages, thus implicitly recognizing deterrence as a reason
for awarding damages).
28 See Bivens, 403 US at 430 (Blackmun dissenting) (criticizing the majority's decision,
claiming it "opens the door for another avalanche of new federal cases"). See also Crawford-El v
Britton, 523 US 574,601 (1998) (Kennedy concurring) ("[Sluits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can illustrate our legal order at ... its worst.... [M]any of these suits invoke our basic charter in support
of claims which fall somewhere between the frivolous and the farcical and so foster disrespect
for our laws.").
23
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harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses
rather than in derogation of them."29' Thus, courts generally allow officials facing such suits to employ the defense of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity is a long-established common law defense.
The purpose of the defense is to allow officials to conduct their duties
without "undue interference ...and [shield them] from potentially

disabling threats of liability."' Qualified immunity reflects a balance
between competing values, protecting both individual rights and the
need for government officials to exercise discretion in the course of
performing their jobs.3 The defense reflects the judgment that the
public interest is best served by allowing for the quick resolution of
Section 1983 and Bivens suits, sparing the need for government officials to waste time and money defending themselves against frivolous
claims.32
Qualified immunity has thus become a fundamental protection
for government officials. Courts adjudicate qualified immunity under
Section 1983 and Bivens identically." Until 1982, in adjudicating qualified immunity, courts focused on the good faith belief of the government official alleged to have violated the plaintiff's rights, as well as
on the objective reasonableness of the official's actions. In Harlow, the
Supreme Court confronted the power of Section 1983 suits, which
operate at a "cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as
a whole. These social costs include the expense of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence
of able citizens from acceptance of public office."'" The Court recognized that qualified immunity was designed to reduce these costs by
resolving insubstantial suits at the earliest possible stages of litigation. " The subjective good faith element of the qualified immunity defense prevented the early resolution of cases and thus was not adequately protecting officials who acted reasonably.'
The Court therefore abandoned this element and instead
switched to an entirely objective inquiry.37 Under the objective test,
qualified immunity is established unless the right violated was "clearly
29 Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 339-40 (1986). By analogy, this principle also applies to
Bivens actions.
30 Harlow, 457 US at 806.
31 Idat 807.
32 See Crawford-El, 523 US at 590 (discussing the reasons behind Harlow's switch to an

objective standard).
33 See Wilson, 526 Us at 609 (stating that courts proceed in the same manner to evaluate
qualified immunity in both types of claims).
34 Harlow, 457 US at 814.
35 Id.
36 Id at 815-16.
37 Id at 818.
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established at the time [the] action occurred," and a "reasonable person" would have known this. 8 Although this switch de-emphasized

Section 1983 as a deterrence tool by increasing the chance that the
suit would be dismissed on summary judgment, it allowed the Court to
reduce social costs resulting from a flood of insubstantial constitutional tort suits. Because the expected costs of facing such suits decline
as a result of the more liberal qualified immunity standard, less deterrence results from the suits in the first place.39
B.

The Federal Wiretap Act and the Good Faith Defense

The FWA ' ° gives effect to three principal legislative objectives: it
disallows unauthorized wiretapping (Section 2511), prescribes procedures for obtaining authorization to wiretap (Section 2516), and authorizes civil suits to enforce its prohibitions (Section 2520). The detail
in the statute supports one of Congress's purposes in enacting the
FWA--"to define on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications
may be authorized."4' The legislative history confirms that Congress
intended to pass "an essentially comprehensive ban on the interception of oral communications" with detailed procedures.42 Further,
Congress intended the civil action remedy under Section 2520 of the
FWA to be "comprehensive and exclusive." 3 Courts confirm that the
FWA is comprehensive. Congress's enactment of extremely detailed
provisions left little room for augmentation by the judiciary. When

Congress establishes a comprehensive program of federal regulation,
Id.
See Evan J. Mandery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity?: The Moral Hazards of
Extending Qualified Immunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 479,480
(1994) (stating that increasing the likelihood of defendants prevailing on qualified immunity increases the chance that legitimate claims will go unredressed). See also Perry M. Rosen, The
Bivens ConstitutionalTort:An Unfulfilled Promise,67 NC L Rev 337,349 (1989) (stating that the
Supreme Court "allows legitimate claims of constitutional violations to go unredressed for the
'greater good"').
40 18 USC § 2510 et seq.
41 Omnibus Crime Control Act § 801(b), 82 Stat at 211. The FWA, as currently amended,
includes approximately ten thousand words. The detail of the FWA contrasts with Section 1983,
which includes just over one hundred words. Further legislative history confirms that Congress
itself thought that the statute enacted was detailed. See S Rep No 90-1097 at 69, reprinted in
1968 USCCAN at 2156 (cited in note 3) (stating that "[t]he need for comprehensive, fair and effective reform setting uniform standards is obvious").
42 See S Rep No 90-1097 at 93,100, reprinted in 1968 USCCAN at 2181, 2189 (cited in note
3).
43
S Rep No 90-1097 at 107, reprinted in 1968 USCCAN at 2196.
44 See Edwards v State Farm Insurance Co,833 F2d 535,538 (5th Cir 1987) (stating that the
FWA sets forth "a comprehensive scheme" regulating the interception of communications).
45 See O'Melveny & Myers v FDIC,512 US 79,85 (1994) (stating courts should not adopt a
court-made rule to supplement a comprehensive and detailed statute).
38

39
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little room remains for courts to improve on that program with federal
common law.4
The FWA prohibits any person from intentionally intercepting,

endeavoring to intercept, disclosing, or endeavoring to disclose intercepted contents from any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or
using any such contents knowing they were intercepted. 7 The FWA
also prohibits shipping interception devices in interstate commerce,

advertising interception devices, and even manufacturing interception
devices in certain circumstances.
The FWA also provides detailed procedures for obtaining authorization to wiretap. 4 This section also contains a lengthy and detailed list of federal crimes for which wiretaps may be obtained.: The
statute imposes analogous procedures on states." The mandatory au1

thorization procedures and list of crimes for which wiretapping may
be authorized further indicate Congress's purpose to prohibit a broad

range of wiretapping and to limit authorizations to serious law enforcement needs.
Section 2520 authorizes civil suits against any person who contravenes the prohibitions in the statute.52 Plaintiffs may sue for equitable
relief, damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees." Furthermore,

for most violations, Section 2520 specifies that damages are (1) the
sum of actual damages and any profits made by the violator as a re-

sult, (2) one hundred dollars per day of violation, or (3) ten thousand
dollars, whichever is greatest. Section 2520 therefore provides a
strong enforcement mechanism: legal and equitable remedies are
available, with minimum damages of ten thousand dollars plus attorneys' fees.

See City of Milwaukee v Illinois,451 US 304,319 n 14 (1980) (stating that "federal courts
46
create federal common law only as a necessary expedient when problems requiring federal answers are not addressed by federal statutory law, [and] the comprehensive character of a federal
statute is quite relevant to [whether to preempt federal common law]").
47
18 USC § 2511. While the presumption is that unauthorized interceptions are disallowed,
Congress recognized that it had outlawed with a broad brush, and painted narrow exceptions to
permit certain necessary types of activities, such as operating switchboards and providing technical assistance to law enforcement officers.
48
Id § 2512.
49
Id § 2516. Section 2516 specifies that the Attorney General (or a designee) must approve
an application by a federal law enforcement agency to a federal judge for such authorization.
50
Id (including, inter alia, crimes such as espionage, sabotage, piracy, bribery, racketeering,
gambling, and money laundering).
51
Id § 2516(2).
52 Id § 2520.
53
Id § 2520(b).
54 Id § 2520(c)(2). Note that 18 USC § 2520(c)(1) limits damages when the violation involves the interception and private viewing of unscrambled or unencrypted satellite or radio
transmissions.
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However, Congress also feared that an official who made an honest mistake could face personal liability under the statute. Thus, the
FWA provides a "good faith" defense to any suit for damages:
A good faith reliance on-(1) a court warrant or order, a grand
jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization; (2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or (3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) of this title permitted the conduct
complained of; is a complete defense against any civil or criminal
action brought under this chapter or any other law.55
In order to demonstrate good faith, a defendant must show that he
subjectively believed that the wiretap was authorized by a warrant or

other means."
The good faith defense was included in the original version of the
statute. 7 From the structure of the statute it is clear that Congress included the defense to guard legitimate law enforcement activities and

to protect officials against liability when acting in good faith. 8 While
the good faith defense has been amended several times to clarify the
types of authorizations that trigger the availability of the defense, its
basic character has never changed. 9 The good faith defense is the only
defense ever included in the statute. The FWA statute is silent as to
the availability of other defenses, including qualified immunity.
C. Procedural Ramifications
The FWA's good faith defense requires inquiry into the "good

faith" of an individual's reliance on a statute or other authorization.
Id § 2520(d).
See Kilgore v Mitchell, 623 F2d 631, 635 (9th Cir 1980) (finding defendant's belief in
affidavit's compliance with statute reasonable); Jacobson v Rose, 592 F2d 515,525 (9th Cir 1979)
(finding good faith defense available only if "defendant had a subjective belief which was objectively reasonable that he acted legally pursuant to court order").
57 Omnibus Crime Control Act § 802, 82 Stat at 223 (stating that "[a] good faith reliance on
a court order or the provisions of section 2518(7) ... shall constitute a complete defense to any
... action brought under this chapter").
58
Omnibus Crime Control Act § 801, 82 Stat at 211. Since Congress's purpose was to protect privacy and deter abuses but to allow officials to use wiretaps when authorized, in particular
for fighting organized crime, the defense provides cover to law enforcement officers acting in
good faith.
59
An interim version of the provision in 1970 stated, "A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action
brought under this chapter or under any other law." District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 § 211(c), Pub L No 91-358,84 Stat 473,654 (1970), codified at 18
USC § 2520, amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 103, Pub L No
99-508, 100 Stat 1848, 1854 (1986). Thus all three versions of the defense provide for "good faith"
reliance on a specified authorization to constitute a complete defense to a civil suit brought under the FWA.
55

56
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Post-Harlow qualified immunity only requires an objective inquiry
into whether the right violated was "clearly established" and whether
a "reasonable person" would have known this.' The differences between the two standards have important procedural ramifications.
Post-Harlow qualified immunity allows courts to resolve the immunity question at the earliest stage of litigation. The early resolution
of the immunity question benefits both the individual defendant and
the general public, as it allows officials to return to their public duties
and eases the possibility of overdeterrence.61 If qualified immunity is
granted at the early stages of litigation, the suit is dismissed, normally
without any discovery. As it is critical to resolve qualified immunity at
the onset of a case, the Supreme Court has authorized interlocutory
appeals from a denial of the immunity defense.6' Thus, qualified immunity can spare officials the burden and expense of full discovery
and trial, as the Court in Harlow recognized. 6
As courts adjudicate the FWA good faith defense on a subjective
basis, the defense normally requires additional factfinding and discovery. 4 The inquiry focuses on the individual motivation of the particular
defendant. Whether a defendant acted in good faith, a question of
credibility and fact, is normally a question that cannot be resolved at
the summary judgment stage, but only by the factfinder after trial. 65 A
defendant who can assert only the good faith defense bears a higher
litigation burden, including discovery. The denial of a good faith defense, in contrast with qualified immunity, may not be the subject of an
interlocutory appeal. 6'
D. Statutory Preclusion
Qualified immunity is a federal common law defense that may. be
precluded by statute. 6 Federal common law is lawmaking power exercised by courts and Congress may always expressly trump any such

Harlow, 457 US at 818.
Id.
62
Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 511, 530 (1985). Note, however, that the Supreme Court has
not extended the right to an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity to cases
raised in state courts that follow a different interpretation of the collateral order doctrine. See
Johnson v Fankell, 520 US 911,916-18 (1997) (rejecting claim that Idaho must follow Mitchell's
definition of "final decision" regarding qualified immunity).
63
See notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
64 See, for example, Tapley v Collins, 211 F3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir 2000) (stating that "a
qualified immunity defense more often can be ... decided earlier in the litigation than a good
faith defense").
65 See id.
66 See id.
67
See Part I.A.
60

61
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provision through statutory enactments.i When Congress enacts a

statute in the same field as a common law provision but remains silent
on its continued existence, courts must decide whether the common
law coexists with the statute.
Courts have not been entirely consistent when preempting prior
federal common law principles.69 The Supreme Court sometimes has
found that if congressional action on an issue is "comprehensive" and
"occupies the field" there is no room for the prior common law principle." This type of statutory preemption is sometimes called "field

preemption."7 This standard recognizes that if a statute contains specific rules, applying the prior common law principles could result in
rewriting those rules. Thus the common law standard is precluded."

This preclusion standard recognizes that the creation of federal common law is extraordinary." When Congress addresses an area previously governed by federal common law, the need for lawmaking by
federal courts disappears.
Other Supreme Court decisions find preclusion only if the statute
specifically addresses the question addressed by the common law. 5
This type of statutory preemption is known as "obstacle preemption.""
If Congress "speaks directly" to the question addressed by the com-

68 See City of Milwaukee v Illinois, 451 US 304, 314 (1981) (stating "when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for
such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears").
69 Preemption of federal common law by federal statute is generally considered under the
rubric of federal preemption of state law, but without the federalism concerns. See, for example,
Resolution Trust Corp v Miramon, 22 F3d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir 1994) (stating that arguments
raised in support of or against preemption are identical regardless of whether federal or state
law is at stake).
70
City of Milwaukee, 451 US at 317-18 (finding that the federal Water Pollution Control
Act was comprehensive and preempted federal common law claims).
71 See, for example, Caleb Nelson, Preemption,86 Va L Rev 225, 227 (2000) (stating that
field preemption embodies a finding that a federal regulatory scheme is so comprehensive that
no room exists for alternative lawmaking authority).
72
See, for example, Barnes v Andover Co, 900 F2d 630,637-39 (3d Cir 1990) (finding Congress has not completely preempted federal maritime common law).
73 City of Milwaukee, 451 US at 314 (stating that "[federal common law is a necessary
expedient").
74
See Mobil Oil Corp v Higginbotham, 436 US 618, 625 (1978) (refusing common law
damages for loss of society in light of Congress's enactment of the Death on the High Seas Act:
"The Act does not address every issue of wrongful-death law ... but when it does speak directly
to a question, the courts are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the
Act becomes meaningless").
75 See, for example, United States v Texas, 507 US 529,534 (1993) (stating that "[in order to
abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by
the common law").
76
See Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in
Regulatory Preemption,45 Case W Res L Rev 823, 832-34 (1995) (stating that obstacle preemption involves trumping state law (or by analogy federal common law) that contravenes Congress's purpose or otherwise interferes with federal regulation).
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mon law, and with contrary purpose, the statute precludes the common law principle.? This standard reflects the understanding that wellestablished common law principles should be retained unless contrary
to the purpose ofthe statute.78
Obstacle preemption analysis is complicated by its reliance on
congressional intent." But assuming that a court can ascertain congressional intent and determine that the federal common law conflicts
with that purpose, obstacle preemption allows a court to make the law
clearer and more consistent."
When considering whether a statute precludes the application of
qualified immunity, courts have sometimes implied an even higher
standard. Because some immunities were "so well established" at the
time the statute was enacted, statutes will generally not be presumed
to preclude them." Unless Congress clearly indicates the intention to
preclude qualified immunity, the defense normally remains available
to official defendants." This type of preemption is normally called express preemption.?' Generally, Congress must expressly disallow qualified immunity in order for courts to find preclusion; "occupying the
field" is normally insufficient.' The heightened standard in qualified
immunity cases reflects an assumption by courts that Congress's intent
is best understood as allowing qualified immunity to remain available.
Thus, courts normally allow qualified immunity unless expressly preempted.?
In determining if a federal common law provision survives a federal statute, whether the court applies a field, obstacle, or express preemption standard, Congress's purpose remains the guiding principle.
The court's "role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting the

77 See Miramon, 22 F3d at 1361 (finding that a clear statutory standard of gross negligence
in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act preempts federal common
law).
78 See United States v Texas, 507 US at 534; Miramon, 22 F3d at 1360.
79 See McGreal, 45 Case W Res L Rev at 833 (cited in note 76) (stating that obstacle
preemption requires a difficult inquiry into the policies underlying a statute).
80 Id ("[O]bstacle preemption is part of the larger mission of statutory interpretation to
make the law the best that it can be.").
81 See Buckley v Fitzsimmons,509 US 259, 267-68 (1993) (noting the long history of reading immunities into Section 1983 and presumption against the preclusion of qualified immunity).
82 See id at 268.
83 See Nelson, 86 Va L Rev at 226-27 (cited in note 71) (stating that express preemption
occurs when Congress includes a clause specifically trumping the prior state law (or federal
common law)).
84 Tapley v Collins, 211 F3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir 2000) (stating that only a clear and unequivocal statement precludes qualified immunity).
85
See Buckley, 509 US at 268 (stating the presumption that Congress would have specifically provided for the abrogation of traditional immunities had it wished to do that).
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[statute], not to make a freewheeling policy choice.". If a court finds
that a statute precludes a federal common law principle, it does so
based on the understanding that Congress desires this outcome. The
intent of Congress remains paramount, even when ,deciding if qualified immunity is available under a statute.
II. FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT CASES AND STATUTORY PRECLUSION

This Part examines the approach of three different courts in recent cases addressing qualified immunity as a defense to the FWA.
The cases employ different reasoning and come to different conclusions. All three examine, at least in passing, the question of whether
the FWA's statutory good faith defense precludes qualified immunity.
None of the three dispositively resolves the statutory preclusion question.
A. Three Recent FWA Cases
In Tapley v Collins,7 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that defendants may utilize qualified immunity as a defense to FWA claims."
The court allowed the defendant to assert qualified immunity because
Congress did not expressly proscribe its use in the FWA." Tapley employed express preemption analysis, and found that qualified immunity remained available.9"
The Tapley court reached its conclusion by weighing several
precedents. The court began with the premise that qualified immunity
should apply broadly.92 Next, Tapley considered other cases that address the question of qualified immunity under specific statutes. Gonzalez v Lee County HousingAuthority93 examined qualified immunity
as a defense under the Fair Housing Act." Gonzalez included a comprehensive review of statutes under which courts concluded that
qualified immunity remained available. 9 Relying on the broad appli86
87

Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335,342 (1986).
Id.

211 F3d 1210(11th Cir 2000).
Id at 1216 (involving chief of police who intercepted cordless telephone conversations
and relayed the contents to other city employees).
90 Id at 1215-16.
88

89

91

Id.

See Buckley v Fitzsimmons, 509 US 259, 268 (1993) (holding that qualified immunity is
"so well established" that Congress must specifically abrogate it to result in preclusion); Malley v
Briggs,475 US 335, 340 (1986) (noting that for "executive officers in general ... qualified immunity represents the norm").
93 161 F3d 1290 (11th Cir 1998).
92

94

Id at 1292.

Id at 1300 n 34 (including inter alia the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and the Sherman Antitrust Act).
95
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cation of qualified immunity, statutory analysis from other cases, and
the procedural differences between the defenses, the court held that
the FWA did not preclude qualified immunity.'
The Sixth Circuit took a different approach to qualified immunity
under the FWA in Blake v Wright," but also concluded that qualified
immunity was not precluded.' The court held that because qualified
immunity was well-established at the time Congress enacted the FWA
and nothing in the statute expressly precluded its application, the defense was available.9 Blake thus uses the express preemption standard
to find that qualified immunity remains available.n
The court weighed the good faith defense against qualified immunity. Because the good faith defense applies to any defendant, but
with a lesser degree of protection, and qualified immunity applies only
to government officials, the court concluded that public officials "receive additional protection in responding to constitutional and statutory claims."'' Blake equates qualified immunity with absolute immunity and reasons that a judge or a prosecutor should not be stripped of
absolute immunity simply because the claim related to a statute that
provided an affirmative defense: "[O]fficials performing governmental
functions should not lose their qualified immunity because of an affirmative defense which might or might not protect them but would, in
all events, require they be subject to extended litigation and deprive
them of the benefits of qualified immunity.'' 2
The D.C. Circuit took a third approach in Berry v Funk.'°' Berry
held that qualified immunity is not available in FWA claims because
of statutory preclusion principles and older FWA precedents.' °4 According to the Berry court, qualified immunity typically applies in
cases of constitutionally based claims (or constitutionally based statutory claims such as 42 USC § 1983) that lack specific legislative guid96

Idat 1300 & n35.

97 179 F3d 1003, 1006 (6th Cir 1999) (involving a police chief who recorded the conversa-

tions of several employees).
98 Id at 1013.
99 Id at 1012.
100Id at 1013.
101Id at 1012. While the good faith defense is available to private defendants, by the terms
of the defense only private defendants such as a telephone company or bank employees assisting
law enforcement with an authorized interception could ever employ it. See Citron v Citron, 539 F
Supp 621, 626 (S D NY 1982) ("[I]t is on reflection self-evident that the good faith defense simply does not apply to actions (civil or criminal) against persons not engaged in law enforcement."), affd, 722 F2d 14 (2d Cir 1983).
102 Blake, 179 F3d at 1012.
103 146 F3d 1003 (DC Cir 1998) (involving the Department of State Communications Office's monitoring of the phone conversations of a high-level official as part of an investigation of
President Clinton).
104 Id at 1013.
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ance.' 5 Since the FWA includes a good faith defense that "is more limited than the qualified immunity good faith doctrine," Congress occupied the field."a Thus, qualified immunity may not be used in the FWA
context: "When Congress itself provides for a defense to its own cause
of action, it is hardly open to the federal court to graft common law
defenses on top of those Congress creates.'.'. Berry uses field preemption analysis to determine that there is a conflict between qualified
immunity and the FWA.Y
Berry acknowledges that prior cases have, in limited circumstances, allowed qualified immunity as a defense to FWA claims.'" In
Halperin v Kissinger"O and Zweibon v Mitchell... the D.C. Circuit rec-

ognized qualified immunity as a defense to FWA claims."' Berry distinguishes those cases as involving a statutory exception under the
FWA, since repealed, that preserved the President's constitutional
power in the realm of national security."' Because the good faith defense originally required reliance on an "authorization" but the FWA
allowed national security wiretaps without authorization, these courts
allowed qualified immunity to be raised when this statutory exemption also was raised in order to fill the gap left by the "authorization"
requirement in the good faith defense. ' According to Berry, the national security area under the FWA was analogous to Section 1983
and Bivens, because it contained gaps requiring judicial interpretation
to fill." But Berry found that where the cause of action arises from activity covered only by the statute (including all FWA cases since 1978),
qualified immunity would not be available."6
B.

The Cases Compared

These three cases set out the two principal differing lines of
analysis for determining whether a defendant may assert qualified

105 Id. Note that Harlow specifically allows qualified immunity for all clearly established
statutory claims, not just constitutionally-based statutory claims. Harlow, 457 US at 818.
106 Berry, 146 F3d at 1013.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 606 F2d 1192 (DC Cir 1979).
Ill516 F2d 594 (DC Cir 1975).
112 Berry, 146 F3d at 1013-14. Earlier precedents are considered in greater detail in Part
III.A.
113 See 18 USC § 2511(3) (1970), repealed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 § 201, Pub L No 95-511,92 Stat 1783, 1797; Berry, 146 F3d at 1013-14.
114 Berry, 146 F3d at 1013-14. See also Zweibon, 516 F2d at 671-72.
115 Berry, 146 F3d at 1014 (stating "in cases where defendants raised this exception the doctrine of qualified immunity applied to plaintiffs statutory claims in the same manner as it applied to plaintiff's constitutional claims").
116 Id.
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immunity in the FWA context: One line holds that because the statute
does not specifically mention qualified immunity, it is available, while
the other finds that because the statute includes a narrower defense, it
is precluded."7 Upon closer examination, none of the three cases discussed fully addresses the issue or the counterarguments to each holding. Neither Tapley nor Blake addresses the similarities of the defenses, and Berry does not consider the differences.
As discussed above, Tapley concludes that qualified immunity is
not precluded based on the doctrine's broad application, express pre-

emption analysis, and the court's survey of other statutes."8 But on
closer examination, much of Tapley's support is misplaced and does

not address the basic question of statutory preclusion. For example,
Tapley cites both Buckley v Fitzsimmons and Malley v Briggs to support its conclusion that qualified immunity should apply broadly."9
While both of these cases recognize the broad constitutional reach of

immunity, neither involves the more complicated question of whether
immunity is available under a statute that provides alternative affirmative defenses."" These cases only demonstrate the uncontroversial
position that qualified immunity is generally available.
Gonzalez is more critical to Tapley's analysis, with its citation of
eleven decisions involving qualified immunity under individual statutes.'"' Gonzalez discussed qualified immunity as a defense to claims

under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), which includes a good faith defense.'" Gonzalez concluded that the FHA did not preclude qualified
immunity.' 3 Gonzalez found no indication in the FHA or its legislative
'

history that Congress intended to preclude qualified immunity. 2

117 One district court case follows a somewhat different line of reasoning. See McClelland v
McGrath,31 F Supp 2d 616,619-20 (N D 1111998). Because the FWA sets forth "in great detail"
the steps that an official must go through to intercept a communication, the immunity would
"rarely, if ever, be available" to officers because they would have difficulty asserting a "reasonable" mistake about the statute. Id. Of course, Blake and Tapley suggest otherwise.
118 See text accompanying notes 88-96.
119 Tapley, 211 F3d at 1214, citing Buckley v Fitzsimmons, 509 US 259, 268-69 (1993), and
Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 341 (1986). While Buckley involves absolute immunity and Malley
qualified immunity, there is no relevant difference in analysis based on the different level of protection. See Tapley, 211 F3d at 1214.
120 In Buckley, a prosecutor asserted absolute immunity to a Section 1983 action relating to
a criminal prosecution. 509 US at 261-62. In Malley, police officers asserted absolute and qualified immunity to defend alleged violations of Section 1983 by applying for a warrant with bad
evidence. 475 US at 337-39.
121 See text accompanying notes 94-96.
122 The Fair Housing Act states in relevant part, "A person shall not be held personally liable for monetary damages for a violation of this title if such person reasonably relied, in good
faith, on the application of the exemption under this subsection relating to housing for older persons." 42 USC § 3607(b)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp 1998).
123 Gonzalez, 161 F3d at 1299.
124 Id.

1384

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:1369

However, the FHA good faith defense is inapposite to the FWA;
the FHA regulates housing discrimination broadly, and the good faith
defense applies narrowly to an exemption from certain provisions
when considering housing for older persons.2' The claim in Gonzalez,
under Section 3617 (prohibiting interference with or threatening anyone enjoying rights or encouraging others to assert rights protected by
the FHA), could not involve that good faith defense.2 Gonzalez's
analysis of qualified immunity does not reference the good faith defense, and the court concluded that qualified immunity is available
under the FHA without discussing the possibility of preclusion."'
Gonzalez does not involve a broad statutory affirmative defense that
was available against the claims asserted in the particular case. Finally,
Gonzalez's review of other cases and statutes, including, inter alia, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Food Stamp Act of 1977, and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, does not include any claims brought under a statute that provides a good faith
(or similar) defense! Neither Gonzalez nor its eleven precedents
provide the close parallel to the FWA that Tapley asserts.
Tapley also fails to address the preclusion argument on its face.
While the Tapley court is correct that qualified immunity generally
applies broadly, the court does not acknowledge that a broad, statutorily provided affirmative defense, available to defendants in the particular case, complicates preclusion analysis. Tapley's analysis begins
and ends with the conclusion that the defenses are not the same."' Tapley applied the express preemption standard without considering
whether obstacle or field preemption could have been appropriate.3
Tapley does not consider the possibility that Congress's goals in the
FWA may be relevant to the preclusion analysis under these circumstances, namely when a statute includes a broad affirmative defense.
As Buckley stated, the court's role is to "interpret the intent of Con-

125 Compare 42 USC § 3607(b)(5)(A) with 18 USC § 2520(d).
126 Contrary to the assertion in Tapley, the good faith defense under the FHA did not factor
into the Gonzalez court's decision that qualified immunity was available as a defense to the Section 3617 claim. See Tapley, 211 F3d at 1214-15; Gonzalez, 161 F3d at 1299-1300 (failing even to
mention Section 2607 and its statutory good faith defense).
127 Gonzalez, 161 F3d at 1299-1300.
128 See, for example, Affiliated Capital Corp v City of Houston, 735 F2d 1555, 1569-70 (5th
Cir 1984) (finding qualified immunity for mayor of Houston in antitrust suit under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act). Other cases, not discussed in Gonzalez, involve statutes into which courts
I ave read good faith requirements. See for example, Lang v Retirement Living Publishing Co,
949 F2d 576,581,583 (2d Cir 1991) (examining the good faith of alleged Lanham Act violator as
part of court-created eight-part test to determine likelihood of confusion between trademarks).
129 Tapley, 211 F3d at 1215 (stating that "qualified immunity and the good faith defense in
the Federal Wiretap Act are not equivalent defenses").
130 Id.
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gress in enacting [the statute], not to make a freewheeling policy
choice... 3

Blake also concludes that there is no preclusion of qualified immunity, but it does not address the specifics of the FWA good faith defense. Blake treats the good faith defense as a generic affirmative de-

fense in its preclusion analysis. "' The Blake court also utilizes the express preemption standard. '3 The court frames the question in terms
of government officials' entitlement to qualified immunity, rather than
congressional purpose or overlap between the statute and common

law."' Blake concludes only that public officials must be entitled to
special protections. Further, while Blake criticizes Berry for failing to
recognize that government officials generally receive special protec-

tion through qualified immunity, it fails to recognize that the good
faith defense applies only to a narrow category of civil cases, and read-

ing qualified immunity into the statute renders the good faith defense

largely superfluous.35' Because the FWA statute does not expressly

state that qualified immunity is precluded, Blake concludes that it
cannot be, without looking to the best reading of the statute or even
its legislative history. Thus, Blake considers the absence of express lan-

guage in the statute to resolve the issue.
Berry's focus on statutory/constitutional distinctions and short
statutory preclusion analysis also does not present the full picture.
Berry does not seriously consider the procedural differences between
the defenses. It does not address Blake's concern that Congress may

have intended for government officials to have preferential treatment.
Berry also does not acknowledge that the standard for preclusion of

qualified immunity may be more difficult to meet than other federal
common law standards. Berry applies the relatively easy-to-satisfy
field preemption standard without considering whether obstacle preemption could have been more appropriate. Thus, the court finds pre-

Buckley, 509 US at 268, quoting Malley, 475 US at 342.
Blake, 179 F3d at 1012 ("[W]e find that simply because [the FWA] provides a defense to
wiretap violations does not necessarily imply that qualified immunity ... does not apply to
this ... violation.").
133 Id.
134 Id (stating that "courts, by adopting qualified immunity as a defense for public officials
only, have signaled that public officials indeed receive additional protection").
135 Compare Blake, 179 F3d at 1012, with Citron v Citron, 539 F Supp 621, 626 (S D NY
1982) (stating "[t]he [good faith] defense is instead available [primarily] to law enforcement personnel"). Similar reasoning to Blake underlies Peavy v Dallas Independent School District,57 F
Supp 2d 382 (N D Tex 1999). The court concluded that because Harlow unequivocally provides
that qualified immunity is available for statutory claims and nothing in the FWA specifically says
that the defense is not available to a civil defendant, the defense is available under the FWA. Id
at 390-91.
131

132
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clusion without considering the Supreme Court's expansive language
establishing a presumption in favor of retaining qualified immunity.'
Thus, none of the cases in this trio persuasively resolves the statutory preclusion question. Each of the three courts considers principally the arguments that favor its conclusion. Putting the three analyses together reveals that the availability of qualified immunity as a defense to FWA claims presents a complex question of statutory analysis
and preclusion. It is clear, as Blake and Tapley state, that qualified
immunity applies broadly. Using the generous field preemption standard, as in Berry, requires the conclusion that qualified immunity is
precluded. In conducting their preemption analyses, none of the FWA
trio considers which preemption standard best reflects congressional
intent under the statute. None of the FWA trio considers the relevance of the obstacle preemption standard, that is, whether qualified
immunity is consistent with the purpose of the FWA.
III. ANALYZING SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: FWA CASES,
GOOD FAITH PROVISIONS IN OTHER STATUTES, AND COMMENTARY

To resolve the question of whether qualified immunity is precluded in FWA claims, this Part examines historical cases and good
faith provisions in other statutes. None of the three recent cases provides a comprehensive historical overview of the two defenses. The
preclusion question is more complicated than any of these cases acknowledge. The approaches taken in older cases and under parallel
statutes suggest employing obstacle preemption analysis in the FWA
context.
A. Pre-1982 Cases Comparing Qualified Immunity and
the Good Faith Defense
When Congress passed the FWA in 1968, courts adjudicated both
the statutory defense and qualified immunity on a subjective, good
faith basis. The only substantive difference between the defenses, until
1982, was the express requirement in the FWA statutory defense that
defendants rely on a "court order or legislative authorization.'.'
Courts interpreting both defenses under the FWA fell into two groups.
One group, examining cases in which the defendant relied on a court
order, found that the defenses were equivalent. The second group, examining cases in which the defendant did not rely on a court order or
legislative authorization, found that in general, the good faith defense
was narrower than qualified immunity, and except for a narrow statu136
137

See notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
See District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act § 211(c), 84 Stat at

654. Note that the original version of the provision controlled from 1968 to 1971. See note 59.
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tory exemption involving national security, defendants could not rely
on qualified immunity. This analysis, finding qualified immunity unavailable unless identical in result to the statutory defense, is consistent with employing obstacle preemption analysis to determine if
qualified immunity remains available.
The first group of cases includes Kilgore v Mitchell, ' in which the
plaintiffs alleged wiretapping violations and sought damages under
both the FWA and the Fourth Amendment." The court found that the
defendants satisfied the statutory defense to the FWA claim based on
their reliance on a letter from the Attorney General aputhorizing the
tap.'" With respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, the court held
that "[i]f the requisites of the statutory good faith defense are met,

then the standard for qualified immunity as a defense to Fourth
Amendment violations is also satisfied."' Under the facts of Kilgore,
with reliance on a court order or legislative authorization, the court
concluded that both the statutory good faith defense and qualified
immunity were met; good faith reliance on an authorization by definition met the acting in reasonable good faith belief standard for qualified immunity. "2

In evaluating a qualified immunity defense under a national security wiretap, another court equated the defenses, noting that "[a]s to
the immunity issue at the heart of this case, the immunity available to
the Attorney General under § 2520 of Title III is in any case identical
to the common law good faith defense applicable to appellants'
Fourth Amendment claim.'. 3
In Jacobson v Rose," the Ninth Circuit equated the defenses
when considering the case of defendants who had relied on a court
order."' The court examined the legislative history and found that
while "§ 2520 does not define 'good faith,' the Senate Report on the
unamended version of § 2520 suggests an analogy to the good faith
defense allowed in § 1983 cases."'6 Thus, the court equated the two defenses, and concluded that the defendants could satisfy the defense
only by demonstrating a reasonable good faith belief that their actions
were legal,'" the same standard that applied to qualified immunity.

139

623 F2d 631 (9th Cir 1980).
Id at 632.

140

Id at 634.

138

Id at 633 (footnote omitted).
Id.
143 Chagnon v Bell, 642 F2d 1248, 1260 n 22 (DC Cir 1980).
144 592 F2d 515 (9th Cir 1978).
145 Id at 523.
146 Id (footnotes omitted).
147 Id.
141
142
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However, the court found the defenses equivalently satisfied under
facts in which the defendants met the statutory requirement of reliance on a court order."8
The second group of cases, finding differences between the good
faith defense and qualified immunity when the defendant did not satisfy the authorization requirement, includes Zweibon. In Zweibon, the
court noted that the literal language of the statute required good faith
reliance on a court order or legislative authorization. ' However, because the case involved executive surveillance, which did not necessarily require a warrant according to Section 2511(3) of the 1970 version
of the FWA, ' -"the language of the defense could not be read literally:
[W]e do not perceive the relevant standard of good faith in this
case to be that literally specified in Section 2520; rather, we find
that a good faith defense to liability, whether under the Bivens
rationale or the statutory theory, will be established if appellees
can demonstrate (1) that they had a subjective good faith belief
that it was constitutional to install warrantless wiretaps under the
circumstances of this case; and (2) that this belief was itself reasonable."'
Thus in the narrow area of national security executive action, instead of allowing defendants to assert qualified immunity, the court
1 2
1
read the good faith defense as equivalent to qualified immunity.
Zweibon conformed the statutory defense to qualified immunity because of its concern that the defendants would be left without any affirmative defense."' Zweibon does not permit the defendants to assert
common law qualified immunity as a defense to the FWA Statute!'
The holding of Zweibon was limited to the circumstances of the case,
involving executive action and national security.' Zweibon's holding,
that qualified immunity and the good faith defense are equivalent under national security wiretap cases, was followed by other courts."
148 Id at 523-24.
149 516 F2d at 670 (noting, however, that the clause was amended to allow reliance on a leg-

islative authorization in 1970, after the relevant facts of the case).
150 See text accompanying notes 113-16.
151 Zweibon, 516 F2d at 670-71 (footnotes omitted).
152 Id at 672-73 (holding that "under the circumstances of this case, the proper statutory
good faith defense is identical with the common law good faith defense that would apply to the
Bivens cause of action").
153 Id at 672.
154 Id at 672-73.
155 Id at 671-73. See also text accompanying notes 111-16.
156 See Halperin,606 F2d at 1208-09. In Halperin, the D.C. Circuit ruled that defendants
could utilize qualified immunity on both Fourth Amendment and FWA claims under the reasonable, good faith standard. While Halperin applies "qualified immunity," it purports to follow
Zweibon in finding the statutory good faith defense and qualified immunity equivalent. See id at
1209 n 115.
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Thus, courts recognized that the statutorily provided good faith defense, as written, could not apply to situations where officials did not
rely on some kind of authorization. Zweibon read congressional intent
in the FWA to allow defendants an affirmative defense based on
qualified immunity because of the complicated national security exemption. Zweibon implicitly employs obstacle preemption analysis-it
allows the defense because, in the national security arena, permitting
defendants to use qualified immunity comports with the purpose of
the statute. Zweibon's conclusion, that qualified immunity was available only under the subsequently repealed national security provision,
does not imply that qualified immunity would be available under the
FWA today."'
In Campiti v Walonis,' the First Circuit did not permit use of the
good faith defense to coexist with qualified immunity under the FWA.
The court rejected the defendants' attempt to claim the good faith defense under Section 2520 "by grafting onto this section of the statute
the good faith immunity defense afforded police officers in 42 USC §
1983 civil rights actions. ' '59 The defendants argued that the FWA defense was equivalent to common law qualified immunity, using the
legislative history of the statute as support.'0 The court rejected that
claim because the plain language of the FWA defense required reli-6
ance on statutory (or court) authorization to satisfy the defense.' '

Campiti found that defendants cannot claim a broader defense than
that provided in the statute. '
In Kilgore and Jacobson, courts found the good faith defense and
pre-Harlow qualified immunity equivalent when a defendant relied on
an authorization satisfying the express terms of the statutory defense.
Zweibon allowed the good faith defense to be broadened to the extent
of qualified immunity in order to cover national security wiretaps.
Campiti did not allow the good faith defense to be so broadened in
the case of normal taps. With the exception of the narrow, national security exception, qualified immunity did not apply under the statute.
Zweibon and Campiti demonstrate that courts during this period

157 See 18 USC § 2520 (1970). See also Berry, 146 F3d at 1013-14 (noting the exceptional
nature of cases like Halperinand Zweibon).
158 611 F2d 387 (1st Cir 1979).
159 Id at 394.
160 Id, citing S Rep No 90-1097 at 107, reprinted in 1968 USCCAN at 2196 (cited in note 3)
(stating that "[a] good faith reliance on a court order would constitute a complete defense to an
action for damages").
161 611 F2d at 394.
162 Id at 394-95. Thus, Campiti disallowed qualified immunity based on implicit obstacle
preemption analysis-permitting the use of qualified immunity contravened the purpose of the
statute under the facts of the case.
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looked to the statute and congressional intent to shape the boundaries
of the good faith defense. These cases implicitly employ obstacle preemption analysis, allowing qualified immunity only when doing so
does not contravene the purpose of the statute. None of these cases
suggests that qualified immunity should be available, as a matter of
course, to wiretap defendants. After Harlow, with objective qualified
immunity, the differences between the two defenses are amplified. The
early FWA cases suggest that courts before 1982 did not allow qualified immunity as a FWA defense without independent justification,
namely, that qualified immunity overlapped with the statutory defense
(but Harlow removes the area of overlap) or that qualified immunity
was allowed under the national security exception (but Congress repealed this provision). Since neither justification Ihas survived, early
FWA cases support the conclusion that qualified immunity should not
be available under the FWA today.
B.

Good Faith Provisions in Other Statutes

As discussed in Part I, the FWA does not expressly preclude
qualified immunity, but it is a detailed statute with the principal purpose of limiting wiretaps. The FWA includes the good faith defense in
order to exempt from liability a reasonably mistaken official relying
on a court order. Examining the good faith defense under other statutes could clarify the FWA's provision and Congress's purpose in including it. Congress has included good faith defenses in various statutes.'o However, most of these statutes and defenses do not interact
with areas of federal common law as does the FWA. Congress has included good faith defenses similar to the FWA's in two statutes that
provide more direct parallels. The language of these statutes, plus
court interpretations of these provisions, could provide additional
clarification of the FWA's statutory defense.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), 6'
in addition to amending the FWA, provides its own cause of action
against electronic communications services companies that violate the
ECPA's prohibitions. 165 The ECPA provides the identical good faith defense contained in the FWA.w As the provisions are worded identi163

See, for example, 21 USC § 1905(c)(2) (Supp 1999) (allowing defense to the violation of

the statute or regulations designed to facilitate the investigation of international narcotics trafficking for actions taken in good faith to carry out such investigations); 8 USC § 1324a(a)(3)
(1994 & Supp 1996) (allowing defense to prohibition on employing unauthorized aliens if defendant has attempted to comply in good faith with the statute's procedures); 16 USC § 1540(a)(3)
(1994) (allowing defense to prohibitions on harming endangered wildlife for actions taken in
good faith belief that such actions were necessary to prevent bodily harm of an individual).
164 18 USC § 2701 et seq (1994 & Supp 1996).
165 See 18 USC § 2707(e).
166 Compare id § 2707(e) (ECPA) with id § 2520(d) (FWA).
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cally, courts' interpretation of the ECPA provision could provide
guidance to courts interpreting the FWA.
Few courts have interpreted the ECPA provision. Davis v
Gracey... adjudicated the good faith defense of the ECPA based on an
objective standard: "To be in good faith, the officers' reliance must
have been objectively reasonable.""8 The court relied on Malley, which
involved a Section 1983 claim and qualified immunity."' Surely, using
an objective standard to adjudicate a good faith statutory defense is
incorrect. If Congress intended the ECPA defense to mirror qualified
immunity, it could have simply parroted those terms in defining the
defense. Good faith has a commonly accepted legal meaning, which
indicates that a court should apply a subjective standard, not objective
qualified immunity.'7 °
The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 ("PPA") 7' also provides a
good faith defense: "It shall be a complete defense to a civil action
[against a government officer or employee] that the officer or employee had a reasonable good faith belief in the lawfulness of his conduct. 172 This provision is not directly parallel because the PPA authorizes suits primarily against state or federal government entities; state
employees may only be sued if the state has not waived its sovereign
immunity.7 3 One case that applied this provision concluded that the
statute did not authorize suits against municipal employees, the defendants in the case."' Another case found that qualified immunity
would only be available as a defense to suits against individuals, not
government entities.' Thus, no courts have parsed the boundaries between the PPA's good faith defense and qualified immunity. Congress
has not employed a statutory good faith defense in other contexts that
inform Section 2520. Neither the ECPA nor the PPA resolves the tension between the good faith defense and qualified immunity.

F3d 1472 (10th Cir 1997).
Id at 1484.
169 Id, citing Malley v Briggs,475 US 335,344-45 (1986).
170 See Part I.C.
171 42 USC § 2000aa et seq (1994 & Supp 1996).
172 Id § 2000aa-6(b) (1994).
173 See id § 2000aa-6(a)(2). Suits against state employees are only permitted if the state has
not waived its sovereign immunity. If the state waives its immunity, the plaintiff must sue the
state and not the individual. See also Davis, 111 F3d at 1481-82 (dismissing PPA cause of action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff did not sue a state or federal governmental entity); Citicasters,Inc v McCaskill,883 F Supp 1282, 1292 (W D Mo 1995) (finding in PPA
suit against government entity that neither prosecutorial immunity nor qualified immunity is
permitted as a defense), revd on other grounds, 89 F3d 1350 (8th Cir 1996).
174 Davis, 111 F3d at 1482 (dismissing suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
175 Citicasters,883 F Supp at 1292.
167 Ill
168
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The older cases demonstrate that, outside the national security
context, courts found the good faith defense and qualified immunity
to be largely equivalent but nonetheless adjudicated them separately
when qualified immunity appeared to offer a broader defense. Other
statutes are not particularly helpful. These sources inform the statutory preclusion question, but do not provide an answer.
IV.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHOULD BE PRECLUDED
UNDER THE FWA

None of the FWA cases that have considered qualified immunity
under the statute fully considers or sufficiently resolves the questions
of statutory preclusion and overlap. This Part considers the cases and
statute in light of the FWA's clear purpose to prohibit unauthorized
wiretaps. As allowing qualified immunity would contravene the purpose of the FWA, courts should utilize obstacle preemption analysis
and prohibit the use of qualified immunity under the FWA.
A. The Purpose and Legislative History of the FWA Argue against
Allowing Qualified Immunity
One principal technique of statutory interpretation is to examine
a provision in light of the purpose of the statute as a whole. Courts
generally acknowledge that the purpose of the statute is a key tool in
statutory interpretation. "6 Courts consider the purpose of a statute of
paramount consideration in interpreting its provisions and scope. Interpreting a statute in accordance with its purpose reflects judicial
deference to legislators: "Sound rules of statutory interpretation exist
to discover and not to direct the Congressional will.".. Purpose may
be used to broaden or narrow statutory language. ' The primacy of
statutory purpose underlies obstacle preemption analysis.'7 9 If a statute's purpose is clear, courts that employ obstacle preemption consistent with° that purpose further Congress's goals and the success of the
statute.'

See, for example, Holloway v United States, 526 US 1, 9 (1999).
Moskal v United States, 498 US 103,117 (1990) (citations omitted).
178 See Associated Electric Cooperative,Inc v United States, 226 F3d 1322, 1326 (Fed Cir
2000) (finding that purpose of Federal Insurance Contributions Act to tax a "broad range of employer-furnished remuneration" directs court to employ broad definitions of "wage" and "employee" in determining whether employer owed Social Security taxes on voluntary early retirement payments); Ingram v Muskogee Regional Medical Center, 235 F3d 550, 552 (10th Cir 2000)
(discussing narrow interpretation of "appropriate medical screening" as most appropriate to
purpose of Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act).
176
177

179

See Part I.D.

See McGreal, 45 Case W Res L Rev at 834 (cited in note 76) (stating that obstacle preemption, when undertaken along with ascertainable statutory purpose, promotes a more successful statutory scheme).
180
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While, in general, statutes are interpreted to preserve common
law meanings and doctrines, that presumption does not survive if contrary to the purpose of the statute."' This principle underlies obstacle
preemption analysis. "Congress' general purpose in enacting a law
may prevail over [the common law meaning] rule of statutory construction.. ' .. Courts in various contexts have used the purpose of the
statute to trump common law presumptions concerning the right of 1a
discharged seaman to wages under the Shipping Commissioners Act, 3
director liability standards under the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,"w and standards as to train
speed and warning devices under the Federal Railway Safety Act of
1970."' The Supreme Court has declined to expand the applicability of
a statutory defense when contrary to the purpose of the statute."" The
purpose of the statute approach suggests a resolution of the qualified
immunity question under the FWA.
The purpose of the FWA, as reflected by the plain language of
the statute, is to discourage unauthorized wiretapping and disclosure
of the content of a wiretap.' Allowing officials to assert qualified immunity contravenes the goal of the statute, to prohibit unauthorized
wiretaps. The statute's comprehensive regulation of wiretapping confirms that the purpose of the statute is to deter government activity in
this area. The FWA thus has a clear purpose that courts should not
hesitate to further through the use of obstacle preemption.
Further, Congress enacted this purpose with detailed provisions.
Congress detailed every aspect of the use and authorization of wire-

181 See, for example, Jones v FederatedFinancialReserve Corp, 144 F3d 961,965-66 (6th Cir
1998) (finding common law theory of apparent authority vicarious liability consistent with the
purpose of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and therefore appropriately used as an "operative
theory of liability" under the statute).
182 Moskal, 498 US at 117 (reading "falsely made" in accordance with Congress's broad
purpose underlying 18 USC § 2314, prohibiting the trafficking of falsely made securities, rather
than the common law meaning of the term).
183 See IsbrandtsenCo v Johnson, 343 US 779, 788-89 (1952) (finding that a listing of specific wage deductions in the Shipping Commissioners Act evinced the purpose to exclude additional, common law deductions).
184 See Resolution Trust Corp v Camhi,861 F Supp 1121, 1127 (D Conn 1994) (finding statutory preemption of the federal common law negligence standard for director liability in financial
institutions).
185See Waymire v Norfolk and Western Railway Co, 65 F Supp 2d 951, 957 (SD Ind 1999)
(finding that the Federal Railway Safety Act preempts federal common law negligence standards
as to train speed and warning devices).
186 See Albermarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 444 (1975) (Rehnquist concurring)
(construing good faith defense to Equal Employment Opportunity Act claim narrowly, consistent with Congress's intent as to scope).
187 See generally 18 USC § 2511.
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taps, and authorized civil suits to enforce the prohibition.'9 Thus, the
statute should not be open to judicial augmentation. "
Courts have consistently found a clear purpose in the FWA to
limit the ability of government officials to use wiretapping to intrude
on the privacy of the general public. "[T]he legislation therefore specifically put strict limits on wiretapping and on how it could be
used.... In construing the statute, it should always be remembered
that 'although Title III authorizes invasions of individual privacy under individual circumstances, the protection of privacy was an overriding congressional concern.'''..Finally, the statute imposes elaborate
safeguards to deter abuse and embodies congressional intent to curtail
wiretapping.'9'
Allowing an objective qualified immunity defense under the
FWA does not conform with the purpose of the statute, and thus
qualified immunity should be preempted as an obstacle to the statute's purposes. Because of the procedural differences between the two
defenses discussed in Part I.C, allowing a defendant to assert qualified
immunity reduces the probability that the case will survive summary
judgment or even a motion to dismiss. Thus, the deterrent effect of allowing civil suits for violations of the FWA protections could be compromised by allowing qualified immunity. Further, even if the defendant cannot utilize qualified immunity, he will be able to defeat the
suit at trial if the factfinder determines that he acted in good faith reliance on a court order or other authorization. This means that the defendant will not be left without protection.
The legislative history of the FWA supports this interpretation.
The Senate Report to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 demonstrates the FWA's primary purpose: to prevent all
wiretapping other than that duly authorized by law enforcement officials.' According to the report,' 93 the legislation codifies the standards

§§ 2516-19.
189 See, for example, FDIC v Ornstein, 73 F Supp 2d 277, 283-84 (E D NY 1999) (stating
that the court's job in the face of a detailed statute is to construe the statute rather than fashion
its own rule). See also O'Melveny & Myers v FDIC,512 US 79,85 (1994) (stating that it is inappropriate to "adopt a court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is
comprehensive and detailed").
190NationalBroadcasting Co v United States Department of Justice, 735 F2d 51, 53 (2d Cir
1984), quoting Gelbard v United States, 408 US 41,48 (1972).
191 Gelbard, 408 US at 50 (quoting congressional findings that state, "it is necessary for
Congress to define [the] ...conditions under which the interception of [electronic] communications may be authorized, [and] to prohibit any unauthorized interception of such communications").
192 S Rep No 90-1097 at 89, reprinted at 1968 USCCAN at 2177 (cited in note 3) ("all
unauthorized interception of such [wire or oral] communications should be prohibited").
193 S Rep No 90-1097 at 28, reprinted at 1968 USCCAN at 2113 (cited in note 3).
188 See id

2001]

QualifiedImmunity and the FederalWiretap Act

1395

set out in Berger v New York1" and Katz v United States.'9 In Berger,
the Supreme Court invalidated a New York statute that authorized
overly broad eavesdrop orders.96 In Katz, the Supreme Court refused
to admit evidence the FBI obtained from a wiretap that had not been
authorized by any judicial order.'9' The report further indicates that
Section 2520 was intended to provide a comprehensive and exclusive
remedy, but that a "good faith reliance on a court order would constitute a complete defense."1'9 Thus, the report indicates a clear congressional signal to restrict the ability of government officials to wiretap
the general public, but provide a defense to officials who acted in
good faith reliance on a court order.
Subsequent amendments demonstrate Congress's expansion of
the causes of action and clarification of the defense. The legislative
history to the 1986 amendment to the FWA, the ECPA, signals Congress's intent to broaden the provisions authorizing civil suits to include suits for "interception, disclosure or intentional use of wire, oral,
or electronic communications."'0 0
B.

Similar Statutes

This Comment's approach has been employed to find qualified
immunity unavailable under other statutes. The False Claims Act
("FCA") was passed in 1863 to discourage fraud against the government and encourage those with knowledge of such fraud to come forward.' °° In light of the statute's clear purpose to encourage reporting
fraud, the Fifth Circuit in Samuel v Holmes" found that qualified immunity should not be available as a defense against FCA claims. ° The
court found qualified immunity precluded notwithstanding legislative
silence as to the availability of qualified immunity because "[g]ranting
government officials the protection of qualified immunity would
hardly spur reluctant employees to step forward."'' Samuel employed
obstacle preemption analysis and found the defense contrary to Congress's purpose. The court reached this conclusion despite the Supreme Court's signal that qualified immunity should apply broadly

388 US 41 (1967).
389 US 347 (1967).
388 US at 44.
197 389 US at 358-59.
198 S Rep No 90-1097 at 107, reprinted at 1968 USCCAN at 2196 (cited in note 3).
199 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-541, 99th Cong, 2d Sess
194
195
196

26.
200
201
202

203

See 31 USC § 3729 et seq (1994).
138 F3d 173 (5th Cir 1998).
Id at 178.
Id.
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and should be available unless Congress explicitly indicated the contrary. The court's reasoning reflects a common sense notion of statutory purpose. When a statute, like the FCA, indicates a clear purpose,

courts should not allow qualified immunity to defeat that purpose.
Courts should use obstacle preemption analysis to trump provisions of
the federal
common law that are inconsistent with the statute's pur204
pose.
Samuel's approach is consistent with generally accepted notions
of statutory interpretation."' Using the purpose of the statute as a factor to be considered when a court evaluates whether qualified immunity should be available as a defense against a cause of action has
found further support in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). . Congress's purpose in passing the ADA was "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."", That purpose may be inconsistent with allowing qualified immunity. Further,
the ADA is detailed; the original statute contained five subtitles and
fifty-nine separate sections °"Thus, the need for augmentation through
judicial interpretation is minimal.
Despite the statute's purpose and detail, several courts have
nonetheless allowed qualified immunity as a defense to ADA claims."l
Apparently most courts have not even considered the possible arguments for disallowing qualified immunity under the statute. The Seventh Circuit appears open to the question of whether qualified immunity is appropriate under the ADA, because of the detail in that law."'
204 See United States v Texas, 507 US 529, 534 (1993) (stating that common law principles
should be applied except when there is a contrary statutory purpose); City of Milwaukee v Illinois, 451 US 304,314 (1981) (noting that federal common law should only be applied in the "absence of an applicable Act of Congress"). See also Part I.D.
205 See, for example, Holloway v United States, 526 US 1, 9 (1999) (stating that statutory language should be interpreted consistent with the provisions of the whole law and "its object and
policy"), quoting John Hancock Mutual Life Ins Co v HarrisTrust and Savings Bank, 510 US 86,
94-95 (1993).
206 See Gary S. Gildin, Dis-QualifiedImmunity for Discriminationagainst the Disabled,1999
U Ill L Rev 897, 928-29 (finding that qualified immunity conflicts with the broad compensatory
purpose of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act).
207 Id at 905, citing 42 USC § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
208 See Walker v Snyder, 213 F3d 344,346 (7th Cir 2000) (Easterbrook) (pondering, without
deciding, the appropriateness of allowing qualified immunity as a defense to ADA claims).
209 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub Law No 101-336,104 Stat 327, codified
at 42 USC § 12101 et seq (1994).
210 See, for example, Hall v Thomas, 190 F3d 693, 696-97 (5th Cir 1999); Gorman v Bartch,
152 F3d 907,914-16 (8th Cir 1998).
211 Walker, 213 F3d at 346 (stating that "[a]lthough several decisions have held or assumed
that individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in ADA litigation ... none of these
decisions discussed whether it is sound to extend immunity principles from litigation under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to suits under more recent, and more detailed, laws"). The claim was dismissed on
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Future ADA decisions may conclude that qualified immunity is not an
available defense. There are clear parallels among these statutes and

the FWA that justify following Samuel and the Seventh Circuit's pondered approach in ADA litigation. The FWA, like the False Claims
Act, contains a strong prohibition against the covered activity, inconsistent with allowing qualified immunity."2 Further, the FWA, like the
ADA, is a detailed statute."3
C.

The Policy Reasons for Objective Qualified Immunity Do Not
Apply in FWA Cases

The policy considerations underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Harlow, switching qualified immunity to the objective standard,"' are not present under the FWA. The focus of the FWA is restricted to a narrow class of cases,"' similar in scope to the FCA ' 6 By
way of contrast, Section 1983 and Bivens are extremely broad, allow-

ing civil suits against government officials who violate any constitutional right.2 ' This breadth led the Supreme Court to make the policy
choice of an objective standard for qualified immunity to avoid
lengthy litigation on a host of patently frivolous constitutional claims.
Since the FWA does not have the same scope, qualified immunity

need not apply for the same reasons.
Congress wrote Section 1983 with breadth and generality, such
that courts have been required to fill in the details of how cases should

be administered."' Because of the fear that a plethora of Section 1983
suits would result in government paralysis, courts have made qualified

immunity easier to satisfy. The generosity of qualified immunity in the
Section 1983 context is, in part, the result of the large quantity of suits
that the statute generates."'
alternate grounds and the court did not address the question. Id.
212 See Part IVA.
213 Compare 42 USC § 1983, which includes just over one hundred words.
214 See text accompanying notes 34-38.
215 For a general discussion of the scope of the FWA, see Part I.B.
216 See Part IV.B.
217 See Part I.A.
218 See Koehn, 32 U Mich J L Ref at 56 (cited in note 20) ("Section 1983's breadth is part of
its strength, but it also operates as a weakness. Because Congress wrote the statute with such
generality, the Court has been free, if not required, to fill in the details.").
219 According to the government, 36,640 civil rights cases involving federal questions (which
would include both Section 1983 and Bivens suits) were filed by private parties during 2000 and
13,415 civil rights cases were filed by prisoners. See 2000 Annual Report of the Director, Judicial
Business of the United States Courts 2000, Table C-2, available online at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/appendices/c02sep00.pdf (visited Sept 8, 2001). These statistics simply indicate filings and overstate the number of bona fide civil rights suits. See Theodore
Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,72 Cornell L Rev
641, 665-66 (1987). However, the magnitude of cases speaks for itself. A Lexis search of all fed-
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While the Court in Harlow sought to correct a perceived imbalance between the needs of plaintiffs and defendants, some scholars
have criticized elimination of the good faith standard. The current
qualified immunity regime may remove the check on government behavior that Section 1983 was designed to provide and the incentive for
states to improve their behavior. "The more the Court cuts back on
the feasibility of a victory by Section 1983 plaintiffs, the more it weakens or even eliminates these incentives."2 Furthermore, in hoping to
minimize costs, the Supreme Court may have generated unintended
externalities, such as removing incentives to learn about and comply
with the law." '
The narrow nature of the FWA and its detailed standards provide
much less opportunity for abuse by potential plaintiffs. If a citizen desired to harass the government through frivolous suits, it is highly
unlikely that he would use the FWA. Importantly, he would have had
to be wiretapped. Suits under the FWA, a narrow and detailed statute,
provide less opportunity for interference with legitimate government
operations. Many of the policy reasons that have resulted in the expansion of qualified immunity simply do not apply to the FWA.
Because the purpose of the FWA statute is inconsistent with
qualified immunity, courts should preempt it using obstacle preemption analysis. When a statute's purpose is contrary to a common law
standard, there is no presumption that that standard should apply.2"
The distinctions between the two statutes discussed above, namely the
FWA's narrow focus, detail, and purpose to deter unauthorized wiretaps, suggest that qualified immunity in its current incarnation is inconsistent with the rationale of the FWA. Qualified immunity is intended to strike a balance between vindicating individual rights and
the public interest in allowing officials to focus on their duties without
the harassment of frivolous suits.m While Congress did not include any
interpretive guidance as to why it included the good faith defense in
the statute, its inclusion, combined with the comprehensive, uniform
standards set out in the law, provides some structural inference. Since
eral courts for the terms "2520" (the FWA provision authorizing damage suits) and "wiretap"
found 514 cases from 1968 to 2001. Notwithstanding the data issues related to civil rights suits,
the contrast between thousands of cases filed per year and 514 cases with decisions in thirty-four
years is obvious.
220 Koehn, 32 U Mich J L Ref at 98 (cited in note 20).
221 See, for example, Mandery, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 513 (cited in note 39) (arguing that
the motivating concern of the Supreme Court with respect to qualified immunity and high-level
government officials has left lower-level government officers with no motivation "to ascertain or
comply with the law governing their conduct").
222 See United States v Texas, 507 US 529, 534 (1993) (noting that to abrogate a prior common law standard a contrary purpose is sufficient).
223 See Harlow, 457 US at 813-14 (finding that qualified immunity strikes a balance between competing interests).
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the FWA includes its own defense, the statute as enacted reflects Congress's judgment about the proper balance between those competing
interests in the wiretap context. Allowing qualified immunity under
the FWA merely tips the scale in favor of FWA defendants.
Courts should not upset the internal equilibrium of the FWA.
Unauthorized wiretapping is not a substantive area in which courts
should be quick to tip the balance in favor of defendants. Uncertainty
in the boundaries of allowable legal surveillance led to abuses under
the FWA's original national security exception, which was repealed for
that reason."' Officials should exercise this surveillance power with
care. If defendants face a larger risk of undergoing discovery and trial,
they are more likely to be careful in obtaining authorizations for wiretapping. Without qualified immunity, officials would have greater incentives to educate themselves about the law."' Government surveillance of citizens is not an area in which officials should be stretching
the boundaries of the law. Congress recognized this in the original
FWA: "To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception
of wire or oral communications ... should be allowed only when au-

thorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain under
the control and supervision of the authorizing court. '' .. In accordance
with congressional purpose, courts should not read the liberal defense
of qualified immunity into the FWA.
Furthermore, disallowing qualified immunity under the FWA
does not leave government officials without protection. The statute
provides the good faith defense, which officials would be free to assert
even absent qualified immunity. As discussed above, they would likely
be forced to undergo more rigorous discovery and possibly trial in the
absence of a qualified immunity defense. However, if a defendant satisfied the good faith defense under Section 2520(d), there would be no
liability. Therefore the police chief in Blake who recorded the conversations of his employees would not be able to win summary judgment,
but, if the court found he acted in good faith reliance on statutory (or
other) authorization, he would not face liability. 22 The police chief in

224

See Part Il.A; Ronald G. Carr, In Honor of Edward H. Levi, 52 U Chi L Rev 300,303-

04 (1985) (discussing the executive branch's questionable conduct in warrantless national security wiretaps before 1975). See also United States v United States DistrictCourt, 407 US 297, 314
(1972) (proscribing warrantless national security wiretaps of domestic groups because of the
threat to individuals who merely have unorthodox political beliefs).
225 See Mandery, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 481 (cited in note 39) (stating that qualified immunity departs from the norm that all citizens are strictly liable for knowledge of the law).
226 S Rep No 90-1097 at 11, reprinted in 1968 USCCAN at 2156 (cited in note 3).The legislative history provides even stronger language: "No one quarrels with the proposition that the
unauthorized use of [wiretapping] techniques by law enforcement agents should be prohibited."
227 Blake, 179 F3d at 1006.
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Tapley who intercepted a cordless phone conversation and shared his
tape with other city employees could also assert the good faith defense.2 The defendants in Berry could also have asserted the good
faith defense, but apparently chose not to do so. 29 Thus, these defendants would not automatically lose their cases absent qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION

The FWA good faith defense and common law qualified immunity utilized the same standard until 1982. Harlow then changed only
qualified immunity to an objective standard. If courts allow qualified
immunity under the FWA, defendants will be far more likely to secure
dismissal of suits before discovery or trial, which could reduce the deterrent effect of allowing civil suits under the FWA. Allowance of
qualified immunity under the FWA also is inconsistent with the statute's purpose of limiting the government's ability to wiretap. Courts
should employ obstacle preemption analysis to trump qualified immunity under the FWA.
Disallowing qualified immunity does not leave defendants without any protections if they attempted to comply with the statute. If
courts restrict qualified immunity under the FWA, defendants may
still assert the statutory good faith defense. Defendants would then
face more incentives to comply with the law. Government surveillance
of citizens is not an area in which officials should push the boundaries
of the law.

Tapley,211 F3d at 1212.
Berry, 146 F3d at 1009-14 (outlining defendants' asserted defenses under 18 USC
2510(4), 2511(2)(a)(i), 2511(2)(c)-(d), 2517, and qualified immunity).
228
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